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In 1968, with an essay first published in The New Yorker, Hannah Arendt 
stimulated American interest in Walter Benjamin. He had been almost 
totally forgotten in Germany until Theodor W. Adorno literally unearthed 
him with the publication of a two-volume collection of Schriften (Frankfurt, 
1955). A selection of Benjamin's essays, Illuminations, translated by Harry 
Zohn with Hannah Arendt's introduction, gave occasion to a fine article 
by Robert Alter (in Commentary, 49 [1970], 86-93) which disputed Hannah 
Arendt's emphasis. This is about all that is worth reading about Benjamin 
in English. In French a different selection of Benjamin's essays published 
in 1959, also called Illuminations, excited little interest except for a cloudy 
essay by Pierre Missac in Critique (23 [1969], 692-710). In German there 
is now a large body of comment, partly collected in a little Suhrkamp 
volume, Uber Walter Benjamin (1968). An elaborate thesis by Rolf Tiede- 
mann, Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins (1965), remains the most 
useful contribution to a study of Benjamin also because of its detailed 
bibliography. A two-volume collection of his Briefe (1966) made his intellec- 
tual development much more comprehensible and we are promised a new 
much fulIer edition of his writings containing many unpublished manu- 
scripts. One article, Manfred Durzak7s "Walter Benjamin und die Literatur- 
wissenschaft" (in Monatsheffe, 58 [1966], 217-23 1) overlaps with the theme 
of this paper though it limits itself mainly to an exposition of Benjamin's 
only booksize publication, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels. 
Hannah Arendt and Robert Alter focus, understandably, on the later 
phases of Benjamin's career: Hannah Arendt telling the story of his life, 
making much of the ill luck which pursued Benjamin even in his death, 
discussing the conflict between his Jewishness and his later Marxism. Robert 
Alter pursues the same topic of the German Jew before and after Hitler's 
rise to power, exiled but unable to accept the condition of exile, torn between 
the call of the Jewish tradition and the new-found faith in Marxism, either 
as messianic hope or, as he said on occasion, as "the lesser evil" (Br. I, 605) 
compared to the horror of Nazism. 
Both authors-and the same is true of almost all comment in German 
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and French I know-treat Benjamin as a philosopher, or at least as a 
Kulturphilosoph, and are preoccupied with his later writings. The English 
translation contains only one piece, "Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers" (1923), 
which belongs to Benjamin's early stage before his conversion to Marxism, 
and they both deny explicitly that Benjamin can or should be considered 
a literary critic or historian. Hannah Arendt goes so far as to say that 
he was "no scholar, no literary critic, no historian, literary or otherwise" 
(Men in Dark Times [New York, 19681, p, 156) though she recognizes that 
Benjamin aspired to be "the only true critic of German literature." She 
quotes a description he gave of the task of criticism but returns soon to 
the question of Jewishness and ends her essay with the hackneyed scholar's 
metaphor about "sea-change": the pearl-diver who will bring up something 
"rich and strange" (ibid., p. 206). Robert Alter in comparing Benjamin 
and Lionel Trilling brings out the contrast between a man steeped in the 
English tradition and Benjamin, "never fully part of an indigenous stream 
of European culture" though paradoxically serene in his ultimate theological 
nostalgia (loc. cit., p. 93). 
All this, however true if we look at Benjamin's later writings and consider 
his cruel fate, is still remote from the actual texts and the issues raised 
by Benjamin's early writings. Benjamin met a Latvian Communist woman, 
Asja Lacis, on Capri in 1924, followed her to Riga in 1925, and spent 
the winter of 1926-27 in Moscow. By that time he had been impressed 
by Georg Lukacs's Geschichte und Klassenbewufltsein and even contemplated 
joining the Communist party (see letter, May 1925, Br. I, 382) though 
he never took the step. But before 1925 we cannot speak of any demonstrable 
use or even knowledge of Marxism. Nor can one say that in these early 
years Benjamin had more than a nodding acquaintance with Judaism 
though he was inevitably conscious of his Jewishness and was constantly 
brought face to face with the problem particularly in the correspondence 
with his Zionist friend and Cabbala scholar Gerhard (or Gershom) Scholem. 
He met Martin Buber (whom he did not care for) and he admired greatly 
Franz Rosenzweig's Stern der Erlosung (1921), a Jewish theology by a man 
who was steeped in Hegel and German idealism. But even these contacts, 
documented by the correspondence which survived in the hands of the 
recipient, Gershom Scholem in Jerusalem, give a distorted picture of Ben- 
jamin's early intellectual concerns and ambitions. At least in his published 
writings they are those of a student of Kant and the German philosophical 
tradition and those of a Gerrnanist deeply read in German baroque, classical, 
and romantic literature. To ignore this is to falsify the image of Benjamin. 
It obscures any attempt to locate him properly in intellectual history and 
to judge his early criticism. It is true, however, that Benjamin's early 
ambitions were frustrated, partly by external circumstances: the inflation 
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of the twenties which deprived him of financial security and drove him 
into journalism and translating from the French, and by the rejection (or 
rather enforced withdrawal) of his Habilitation in Frankfurt. But this 
ultimate failure and the shift of interest and change in philosophical 
allegiance should not minimize the significance of his early writings. Their 
topics will be obvious if we enumerate the main articles and books written 
before 1926. If we ignore, mercifully, Benjamin's early involvement in the 
Youth Movement before World War I we must consider his paper "Zwei 
Gedichte von Friedrich Holderlin" (1914-15, in T, 22-46), a paper "Uber 
Sprache uberhaupt und uber die Sprache des Menschen" (A, 9-26), his 
Bern dissertation, Der BegrifS der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik 
(1919, published 1920), a long essay on Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften 
(written in 1922, published in 1924), an introduction to a translation from 
Baudelaire, "Die Aufgabe des ~bersetzers" (1923), and finally a book, 
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (written in 1925, published in 1928). 
To these should be added reflections ''Uber das Programm der kommenden 
Philosophie" (1918), on "Schicksal und Charakter" (1921), and an excursion 
into abstract political philosophy, "Zur Kritik der Gewalt" (1921). An 
eccentric, slight review of Dostoevsky's Idiot which considers it as 
Dostoevsky's "great lament on the failure of the movement of youth" (A, 
188) belongs to this period (published in 1920). 
Like most intelligent students at that time Benjamin was uninterested 
in the conventional literary scholarship which is, somewhat inaccurately, 
labeled "positivism" or Scherer-Schule. He rather studied philosophy, first 
with Heinrich Rickert in Freiburg im Breisgau before the War and then 
in Bern. He was steeped in the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school, 
particularly of Hermann Cohen, and read Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, and 
later Jaspers and the early Heidegger. As the "Programm der kommenden 
Philosophie'" shows, Benjamin felt that Kant, for whom he had the greatest 
admiration, was limited by the Enlightenment and his scientific concept 
of experience. The program proposes a correction of the Kantian concept 
of knowledge, which seemed to Benjamin oriented exclusively toward 
mathematics and mechanics, in favor of a concept of knowledge which 
would include religion and theology and would be at the same time 
"linguistic." "Linguistic" means for Benjamin a concept of language he 
derives from Hamann and Novalis and possibly from Jewish Gnosticism. 
The paper "Uber Sprache iiberhaupt und tiber die Sprache des Menschen" 
(1918) expounds the view that everything, even things and animals, have 
a language and that language is the only thing communicable in a being. 
Man, however, differs from animals and things by his ability of naming. 
"In the name the spiritual being of man communicates with God" (A, 
13). Thus language is not thesei, by convention, but physei, by nature: 
a primitive, paradisiacal language is assumed of which all existing languages 
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are only translations. Man, Benjamin believes, is fallen and so is nature. 
If nature could speak it would mourn but its sadness makes it fall silent 
(A, 24). The whole of nature is permeated by a nameless silent language. 
Language is thus the symbol of the incommunicable. Logos, the word of 
God, is the unity of this language movement (A, 25-26). 
Benjamin would have rejected the view that this concept of language 
is mystical as he considered mystical only the view that the word is the 
essence of the thing. This seems to him mistaken, "as a thing in itself 
has no word: it is created out. of the word of God and known by its name 
according to the word of man" (A,  19). Still, the view would seem today 
neither scientific nor properly speculative, even though the idea of an 
original language has been revived by Noam Chomsky in very different, 
rationalistic terms. "Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers" (1923) assumes that there 
is this original language and that translation is an expression of the inner 
relationship between languages. The integration of many languages into 
a single true one inspires the translator. In practice Benjamin recommends 
a translation which would "turn German into Hindi, Greek, or English," 
quoting Rudolf Pannwitz. Benjamin praises Holderlin's translations from 
Sophocles and Pindar (surely extravagant distortions of their originals) 
and concludes by saying, "The interlinear version of the Scriptures is the 
prototype or ideal of all translation" (I, 69). Nabokov might approve on 
other grounds but a theory of translation which first and last wants a genuine 
poem in the language of the translation makes much more sense from 
an aesthetic point of view. 
But aesthetics did not interest Benjamin. His theory and practice of 
criticism grew out of his engagement with Romantic criticism. His thesis 
Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik (1919, published 
1920) is at first sight a school-work which keeps within the limits of a 
historical exposition and interpretation. Still, the way Benjamin anchors 
the concept of criticism of the Romantics (in practice, only of Friedrich 
Schlegel and Novalis) in the concept of reflexion, derived from Fichte, 
and how he elaborates the contrast between the Romantic conception and 
that of Goethe is not only original but helps, at least by exclusion, to 
define his own position. Benjamin thinks that Goethe accepted the ultimate 
impossibility of criticism while Friedrich Schlegel consistently exalted 
criticism over creation (Ku., 99). In Schlegel, Benjamin formulates, "the 
totality of works fulfills itself in the infinity of art; in Goethe, on the 
contrary, the multitude of works always rediscovers the unity of art" (Ku., 
105). The romantic infinity is one of pure form, the unity of Goethe's 
idea is one of pure concept (Ku., 106). A further contrast between Schlegel's 
ideal and Goethe's ideal is construed. Goethe's ideal appears as "style," 
as "a subtle naturalism" (Ku., 106), while Schlegel does not postulate a 
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specific content of art but only an idea of poetry as form and a theory 
of the novel as the acme of poetry. The contrast as drawn by Benjamin 
seems oversharp. The documentation is narrowly limited to a few texts 
from Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis (which do not always agree). Many 
motifs in Schlegel's thought are ignored or dismissed, such as his concept 
of evolution in art history or of "Charakteristik," wrongly disparaged in 
a note (Ku., 60n). Still, whatever allowances one must make, the thesis 
makes Benjamin's own somewhat later concept of criticism stand out more 
clearly. 
It is impossible to misunderstand it. Criticism searches for the truth- 
content of a work of art (I, 70), or, phrased differently, it "looks for the 
sisters of a work of art which must be found in the realm of philosophy" 
(I, 118). Works of art have a deep affinity with the ideal of a philosophical 
problem. All beauty is related to truth. But Benjamin insists that this 
relationship must not be thought of as truth being somehow concealed 
within a work of art. Benjamin expressly disapproves of the Hegelian 
"sensual semblance of the Idea." Beauty is not a cloak, not a wrapper, 
not appearance but essence (Wesen). Criticism must respect the veil: it 
must not attempt to lift it (I, 141). The critic can only define an analogon 
of a work of art. The sublime power of truth appears precisely in the 
inexpressive, a truth which is discoveredin the nature of language (I, 140-41). 
Something like phenomenological "Wesensschau" seems envisaged and one 
might be struck with the similarity to Heidegger. 
But this is somewhat deceptive if we examine the negations and rejections 
in Benjamin's concept and the concrete procedure of his interpretations. 
Benjamin strongly rejects the biographical or simply the expressive approach 
to a work of art. A work cannot be derived from life (I, 101). Nor does 
Erlebnis define a work of art. Benjamin argues even that this concept is 
"devised by Philistines to make poetry harmless, to rob it of its relation 
to truth" (I, 112), hardly a fair description of the motivation of Dilthey. 
Nor can Benjamin ascribe a decisive importance to the professed intentions 
of the poet. His pronouncements need not prescribe to the critic (I, 86), 
nor may the poet be clearly conscious of the truth-content of his own work 
(I, 91). Thus Benjamin must criticize Gundolfs book on Goethe as it is 
ultimately, in spite of contrary professions, biographical. The glorification 
of the "figure" of Goethe, a hybrid of hero and creator, amounts to an 
exaltation of the life of the poet at the expense of the work. The dogma 
of the Goethe cult: that Goethe's life is his greatest work, accepted by 
Gundolf, leads to an abdication of criticism. Benjamin does not believe 
that a human life can be treated as a work of art. Gundolf creates a type 
of a shapeless hero-poet, "a mendacious monumentality" (I, 109). 
Benjamin had been an admirer of Stefan George and even much later 
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quoted him and wrote gratefully acknowledging George's role in his early 
life (see I, 142, 156, 171). But Benjamin was necessarily more and more 
repelled by the claims of authority and leadership made by the group, its 
exclusiveness, snobbery, and bombastic phraseology. Still, as late as 1930 
Benjamin reviewed Max Kommerell's book, Der Dichter als Fuhrer in der 
deutschen Klassik, with great admiration mixed with revulsion against the 
claim that German classicism is a living, life-giving authority (see A ,  434 ff.). 
Benjamin rejects with equal emphasis any approach through the reader 
or his psychology. He dismisses "empathy" or substitution as a mere cloak 
for what one must assume to be idle curiosity (Ur., 40). In dramatic theory 
he disagrees with the whole problem of katharsis. Most radically Benjamin 
formulates: "In the appreciation of a work of art or an art form, con- 
sideration of the receiver never proves fruitful. Not only is any reference 
to a specific public or its representatives misleading, but even the concept 
of an 'ideal' receiver is detrimental in the theoretical consideration of art 
since all it assumes is the existence and nature of man as such. Art, in 
the same way, assumes man's physical and spiritual existence but in none 
of its works is it concerned with his response. No poem is intended for 
the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the listener" (I, 
56; Zohn's translation slightly changed, p. 69). No c'Rezeptionsgeschichte," 
no Marxism at that time for Benjamin. 
Even the historicity of the work of art is rejected in the same year 
(December 1923). "I consider it as settIed that there is no history of art. 
The work of art is essentially unhistorical: at most one can write a history 
of themes or forms but not a history of works of art" (BE I, 322-23). 
The highest reality in art is "an isolated, closed work" (Ur., 42). As late 
as 1926 Benjamin asks for recognition of "the radical uniqueness of a work 
of art." "It arises from the creative point of indifference in which insight 
into the nature of the Beautiful and of art interpenetrates with insight 
into the absolutely unique work" (Literaturblatt der Frankfurter Zeitung, 
7. 11. 1926, quoted in Tiedemann, p. 44). Works of art are conceived as 
Ideas existing in complete isolation, "in perfect independence and inviola- 
bility, not only from the phenomena but even more from each other" (Ur., 
19). Benjamin believes "in the discontinuous structure of the world of ideas" 
(Ur., 14) and thus must object to system or any attempt at systematization. 
On occasion he accepts the Leibnizian ideas of the monad. "We enter into 
the interior of a work of art like into a monad of which we know that 
it has no windows but bears within the miniature of the whole" (Tiedemann, 
44). Benjamin here seems not so distant from Croce (even though his 
vocabulary is very different). Croce also refused to believe in the possibility 
of a history of art, emphasized the uniqueness of the single work and 
invented a term, cosmicit&, which tries like Benjamin's monad to suggest 
WALTER BENJAMIN 
the simultaneous uniqueness and universality of a work of art: the old 
idea of the reflection of the macrocosmos in the microcosmos. 
Benjamin's Platonic world of essences explains the attraction which 
Proust's essences recalled by involuntary memory had for him. The later 
idea of an "aura" of a work of art must have evolved from it. Benjamin 
in his most famous essay, "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner Repro- 
duzierbarkeit" (1934). seems to welcome, as a democrat and avowed Marxist, 
the spread of works of art to all manner and conditions of men, the ease 
of their reproduction, the rise of new popular arts such as the film, and 
he seems to predict, almost like Marshall McLuhan, the end of the 
Gutenberg era, the end of contemplative reading, the "liquidation of the 
traditional value in the cultural heritage" (I, 153). But clearly even then 
Benjamin's attitude is ambivalent: he also deplores the destruction of the 
aura, the detachment of art from cult and myth. It is an elegy on the 
past of art and of his own former concept of art which in its early stages 
centered on myth and the mythical as the acme of art and truth. 
The early essay, "Zwei Gedichte von Friedrich Holderlin" (1918), starts 
with drawing a distinction between the poem and "das Gedichtete." It 
seems an awkward concept (soon abandoned, I think) which tries to locate 
a sphere between the poem and life. It  is, I presume, a term for what 
elsewhere is called "inner form." Once it is described as a union of form 
and content and we are told that "das Gedichtete" differs from the poem 
by greater definiteness (I, 23). But "das Gedichtete" is also related to 
myth and the distance from myth and the nearness to life is considered 
a criterion of value: the poem is the poorer the nearer it is to life (I, 
24). [I do not understand how a few pages later, Benjamin can say that 
"das Gedichtete" is identical with life ("identisch dem Leben," I, 32).] 
This somewhat murky meditation serves as introduction to a comparison 
of two of Holderlin's odes: "Dichtermut" (1800) and "Blodigkeit" (1804). 
Benjamin decides that these two odes-which overlap verbally at several 
points-can be discussed in terms of a contrast between the mythological 
and the mythical. The earlier poem is mythological, the later mythical: 
mythological apparently implying a purely external reference to ancient 
mythology while "mythical" refers to Holderlin's creation of myth as it 
was then being exalted in  the edition and lectures of Norbert von 
Hellingrath. But the evidence for the contrast between the two poems seems 
to me forced: the reference to "our ancestor the Sun God" in the earlier 
poem has no different status than the address to "our Father, the God 
of Heaven" in the second poem. Benjamin sees there an identification of 
the living and the celestial being: a fateful link of the living and the poet 
which is supposedly absent in the earlier poem. But in "Dichtermut" the 
singers of the people also accept a beautiful death as the sun and the 
Sun God do in setting into the purple flood. In the third stanza of "Blodig- 
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keit," in a tortuous sentence, the gods are said like man to be  "a 
lonely beast" and the song and the choir of princes are said to "have 
brought the Heavenly back to earth." It does not seem necessary to interpret 
"Einkehr" as death, as Benjamin does, nor is it at all clear why the later 
poem is superior to the earlier one. Actually the two poems say substantially 
the same: they assert an identity of all living things and an identity with 
the gods even in death. They proclaim the poet's acceptance of death and 
fate and assert that the poet has something to offer to mankind and his 
nation. They both fit into the scheme of Holderlin's myth-making as it 
was, for instance, recently analyzed by Ulrich Gaier ("Holderlin und der 
Mythos" in Terror und Spiel, ed. Manfred Fuhrmann, Munich, 1971). The 
distinction between the mythological and the mythic is not convincing. 
The long paper on Goethe's Wahlvenvandtschaften (1922, pub. 1924) also 
interprets the novel as mythic. Benjamin argues that the novel should not 
be seen in terms of marriage as a social or moral problem. The famous 
eulogy of marriage pronounced by Mittler ( Werke, Jubilaumsausgabe, XXI, 
80) is not Goethe's. It is disparaged by the teller when he comments: "So 
sprach er lebhaft und hatte wohl noch lange fortgesprochen." Rather, 
Benjamin thnks that Goethe wanted to display the forces of law which 
arise out of the ruin of the marriage. "In its dissolution the human and 
the mythic survive" (I, 75). Benjamin thus minimizes the social surface 
of the novel. He dismisses the shallow moralistic opinions of Goethe's 
contemporaries and also Goethe's own pronouncements about his intentions. 
Benjamin considers them examples of Goethe's liking for mystification and 
obliging platitudes. The title metaphor of the book, Elective Affinities, is 
not as other interpreters have seen it, considered central. It suggests not 
a deeper harmony between man and nature but only the special harmony 
of the natural strata of the four persons involved (I, 79). Somewhat 
overingeniously Benjamin argues that even this natural harmony between 
Eduard and Ottilie is not perfect. Ottilie plays the piano accompanying 
Eduard's flute but Eduard plays badly. Eduard allows Ottilie to look into 
his book when reading aloud but this is really bad manners. He calls her 
amusing but she actually never said a word. The two preserve a feeling 
for what is proper but they lost it for what is moral. They fall silent (I, 
80). Oddly enough in view of the interpretation Benjamin will give to 
Ottilie's final falling silent this silence is here considered an unfavorable 
judgment. Eduard and Ottilie are "deaf toward man and toward the world" 
(I, 80). The scarcity of proper names in the novel is then regarded, not 
as it had been interpreted by &chard Moritz Meyer as a "classicist" desire 
for the typical but as a failure of language, of naming. It is paralleled 
by the important role of things in the action: the chalice, the chest, the 
mill, the house on the hilltop. 
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The center of Benjamin's interpretation is the dying and death of Ottilie. 
Her death is a mythical sacrifice. Ottilie, however, does not sacrifice herself 
nor is she a victim of fate (as two reviewers of the time, highly praised 
by Goethe, Abeken and Solger, stated) but it is a sacrifice for the redemption 
of the guilty. The atonement has always been the death of the innocent, 
at least in the mythic world the poet evokes. Hence Ottilie dies a martyr's 
death in spite of her committing slow suicide (I, 86). Benjamin rejects the 
view that Wahlverwandtschaften preaches renunciation, There is "no struggle 
between duty and inclination," there is rather regret for a life of missed 
opportunities (I, 90-91). Benjamin rehearses the evidence for Goethe's fear 
of death, of his sense of the "demonic" and his cult of self with immortality 
reserved only for the great. At times he uses biographical explanations: 
thus he alludes to Goethe's thirty years' struggle against marriage until 
he capitulated by marrying Christiane (I, 110) and he even speaks of all 
of Goethe's later works as "masked Penitence" (I, 11 1). 
Benjamin returns then to the final scenes of Ottilie's martyrdom: her 
complete silence is not due to any decision of hers but is the silence of 
the moral voice, mere instinct (I, 122-23). Benjamin even alludes to the 
fact that Minna Herzlieb, the supposed model of Ottilie, died in a mental 
institution (I, 123), an event that occurred many years after the publication 
of the book but is somehow considered relevant retrospectively. Benjamin 
makes much of the beauty of Ottilie, her nymph-like quality, her affinity 
with water (I, 129) and the moon (I, 132). He insists that there was no 
true love between Eduard and Ottilie (I, 133). True love is rather depicted 
in the inserted story, "Die wunderlichen Nachbarskinder," which is 
interpreted as an antithesis of Ottilie's story. It depicts triumphant 
redemption compared to Ottilie's sacrifice. In the last pages of the paper 
Benjamin refers to a passage (Werke, XXI, 260): "Die Hoffnung fuhr wie 
ein Stern der vom Himmel fallt, iiber ihre Hgupter weg." Benjamin takes 
this oddly enough as an expression of hope for redemption, as the central 
mystery of the whole work (I, 147). But the passage seems misinterpreted 
or at least misused. The sentence occurs quite casually in the meeting of 
Eduard and Ottilie when Eduard finds her with the baby under the oak, 
when he curses his double adultery just before the drowning of the child. 
The star that falls from heaven is a shooting star, a delusion. Hope rushes 
away above their heads. A hope of resurrection and of a reunion of the 
lovers in afterlife is expressed only in the very last sentence of the novel: 
"welch ein freundlicher Augenblick wird es sein, wenn sie dereinst wieder 
zusammen envachen" (Werke, XXI, 302). This sentence seems to me merely 
a gesture toward an orthodox belief in resurrection, as the whole conclusion 
of the book must be seen, together with the final scene of the second part 
of Faust, as a Catholic allegory complete with a miracle-working corpse 
exempt from decay, with angels, Gothic chapels, etc. The whole Nazarene 
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decoration cannot, to my taste, be saved aesthetically by Benjamin's mythic 
interpretation. 
I am unconvinced by the "distrust of the word and confidence in the 
power of silence" (to quote Franz Rosenzweig's Stern der Erlosung [1921, 
second ed. 1930, 3rd part, p. 531, who considers this view as "Jewish in 
the deepest sense") implied in Benjamin's myth. Nor can I see how this 
is reconcilable with other passages in this dense paper which seem to 
consider silence or lack of speech as a failure both humanly and artistically, 
as after all "naming" is the privilege and task of man and of the poet 
in particular. In both papers, that of Holderlin and that on the Wahl- 
verwandtschaften, Benjamin seems to me failing precisely as a literary critic. 
His interpretations are governed by a notion of myth which is conceived 
as a standard of value but is never defended or even explained as such. 
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (written in 1925, published in 1928) 
is, no doubt, Benjamin's best early publication, It has an unfortunate 
organization: the obscure abstract first chapter must have defeated most 
early readers as it did Max Rychner (see ~ b e r  Walter Benjamin, Frankfurt, 
1968, p. 25) (and probably the Professors at Frankfurt, anyhow not inclined 
to accept a Jew). The title is also misleading unless we understand that 
"Ursprung" does not mean origin at all but something like the idea of 
a genre (Ur., 29). It is rather Goethe's Urphanomen transferred to history 
(Tiedemann, p. 60). Moreover "Trauerspiel" does not mean tragedy but 
is the term in Benjamin for what one would possibly call "lament" or 
"play of lamentation" (the actual term, first used, I believe, by Philip von 
Zesen, is simply a Germanization of "tragedy" with no sense of a different 
connotation. It is surely used so by Novalis in the passage quoted by 
Benjamin, Ur., 136). This genre is according to Benjamin best exemplified 
in German seventeenth-century plays though he recognizes that they are 
often inferior aesthetically. Still, the genre includes not only Calder6n but 
also Shakespeare's Hamlet and continues in the plays of Sturm und Drang 
and in the drama of fate, the Schicksalsdrama from Schiller to Grillparzer. 
"Trauerspiel" is not tragedy. It is rather history, the fall of princes or 
the death of martyrs, two topics which Benjamin considers almost identical, 
a lament about fate and death. "Fate drives toward death. Death is not 
punishment but expression of the forfeiting of guilty life to the law of 
the life of nature" (Ur., 140). The contrast to Greek tragedy based on 
myth and a flawed hero's revolt against the gods is obvious. "Trauerspiel" 
is not tragic, but sad. The melancholiac is its protagonist. Allegory is its 
method. 
Benjamin makes an effort (preceding in time the modern defenses of 
allegory, C. S. Lewis', Honig's, or Angus Fletcher's) to contrast allegory 
with symbolism and to defend its method. He expounds Goethe's 
enormously influential distinction between allegory and symbol (which has 
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been taken over by Coleridge) to dismiss it as "untenable" (Ur., 177). 
Allegory has for him the advantage over the momentary symbol of a spread 
in time. It expresses a view of nature as fallen which Benjamin approves 
of. He connects it correctly enough with emblems, with the old idea of 
hieroglyphics, with the deanimation and fragmentation of nature. Allegory 
opposes the symbol as it prefers the thing to the person, the fragment 
to totality. We are never told why things should be preferred to persons 
or fragments to a totality (Ur., 208-09). Still, Benjamin brings out the 
characteristics of a procedure of art which has been revived in the twentieth 
century. Baudelaire, Benjamin's later preoccupation, constitutes the bridge 
in the nineteenth century. We might think today of Kafka, Camus, Orwell, 
Bulgakov and many others. 
Benjamin's book shows skill and erudition in quoting German baroque 
dramas: Gryphius, Lohenstein, Hallmann, and others. He makes frequent 
references to classical, medieval, and romantic authors and theories. He 
is steeped in German Geistesgeschichte, quoting, mostly with approval, 
Dilthey, Burdach, Walzel, Hankamer, Cysarz (about whom he voiced 
misgivings; see Br. 354 and Ur., 39), Strich, Hubscher, Borinski and many 
others. Benjamin, in this book, even succumbs to the lure of Geistesgeschichte 
all too easily. He generalizes loosely about the different periods and does 
not ask himself often enough the question whether the same phenomena 
cannot be found in other periods or whether a different interpretation could 
not be made of identical quotations. The references to Shakespeare seem 
a case in point. Iago and Polonius cannot be labelled "demonic fools" 
(Ur., 195); it seems too facile to dismiss Hamlet's death as not tragic because 
of the chance of the sword play (Ur., 147) and he misinterprets Hamlet's 
speech: 
What is man, 
If his chief good and market of his time 
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more. 
Sure he that made us with such large discourse, 
Looking before and after, gave us not 
That capability and god-like reason 
To fust in us unus'd. 
(W, 4) 
Benjamin calls this "Wittenberg philosophy and a revolt against it" (Ur. 
150), though it seems nothing less than an assertion of man's "god-like 
reason." It does not propound an "empty world" as Benjamin would want 
to have it. 
But these are details compared to the result of the book and the shift 
it indicates in Benjamin's thinking. The belief in myth as essential for poetry 
is abandonded. The static concept of a realm of ideas is loosened. A 
philosophy of history is implied. Time and history define the concept of 
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allegory. Though determinism is still rejected (Ur., 138), the later acceptance 
of a messianic Marxism becomes comprehensible, especially when seen 
in the context of the times. But this is another story. 
NOTE 
I quote Benjamin from the two collections IlIuminationen (Frankfurt, 196 1) as 
I and Angelus Novus (Frankfurt, 1966) as A ,  as the older Schriften (2 volumes, Frankfurt, 
1955) is out of print. Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels is quoted from the revised 
edition by Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt, 1963) as Ur., Br~efe, 2 volumes, (Frankfurt, 
1966), as Br. I refer to Der Begrig der Kunstkrztik in der deutschen Romantik (Berlin, 
1920) as Ku. 
